Monday, November 17, 2014

The First Amendment TRUMPS Trademark. Yet First Amendment Attorney Marc Randazza gets court to STEAL massive gripe sites from Blogger Crystal Cox claiming "Trademark" Violations. Talk about Abuse of Process and Abuse of Privilege as an Officer of the Court.

Research Links for those Researching Cases in which 
the First Amendment Trumps Trademark

First Amendment Trumps Trademark in Call of Duty Case
http://digilaw.edwardswildman.com/blog.aspx?entry=4878


District Court Holds That First Amendment Trumps Trademark Rights
http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&newsletter=8&id=6252


When does the First Amendment trump trademark law? 11th Circuit adopts Rogers v. Grimaldi test
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=acc79d7d-9ceb-4c66-8073-2e61cd8b4362



E.S.S. Entm’t 2000 v. Rock Star Videos: First Amendment Trumps Trademark Rights
http://www.lawupdates.com/commentary/iess_entmt_2000_v_rock_star_videos_i_first_amendment_trumps_trademark_right


EFF to Court: A Trademark Is Not A Censorship Tool
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/eff-court-trademark-not-censorship-tool


First Amendment TRUMPS Trademark;  Big Ruling Says Using Trademarks In Artistic Works Can Be Protected Under The First Amendment
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120613/18230119312/big-ruling-says-using-trademarks-artistic-works-can-be-protected-under-first-amendment.shtml


The Constitutional Trump Card: How a Trademark Infringement Game is Won Using a First Amendment Defense
"This session will address the tension between constitutional protections for expressive works and the Lanham Act’s prohibition on trademark infringement, unfair competition and false advertising.

Our speaker will discuss the expanding popularity of the Rogers v. Grimaldi First Amendment defense test and how his firm successfully used the Rogers test to defend a video game industry client in a trademark infringement action."
https://www.bostonbar.org/membership/events/event-details?ID=17092



Overview of Trademark Law
"Finally, certain parodies of trademarks may be permissible if they are not too directly tied to commercial use. The basic idea here is that artistic and editorial parodies of trademarks serve a valuable critical function, and that this critical function is entitled to some degree of First Amendment protection. The courts have adopted different ways of incorporating such First Amendment interests into the analysis. For example, some courts have applied the general "likelihood of confusion" analysis, using the First Amendment as a factor in the analysis. Other courts have expressly balanced First Amendment considerations against the degree of likely confusion. Still other courts have held that the First Amendment effectively trumps trademark law, under certain circumstances. In general, however, the courts appear to be more sympathetic to the extent that parodies are less commercial, and less sympathetic to the extent that parodies involve commercial use of the mark."
https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm


When Does the First Amendment Trump Trademark Law?
11th Circuit Adopts Rogers v. Grimaldi Test
http://www.martindale.com/matter/asr-1586918.Trump.pdf


Trademark Laws SHOULD NOT be used to trample First Amendment Rights
"In a blog post titled “NACCP: National Association for the Abortion of Colored People,” Radiance Foundation Inc. (“Radiance”) stated that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) holds “all things liberal, most things socialistic, and nothing pro-life.” On April 24th, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found Radiance liable for trademark infringement and trademark dilution for its use of NAACP’s trademark in its blog post. Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57431. The court ruled that Radiance violated the Lanham Act, provisions 15 U.S.C. §1114 and 1125, as well as Virginia Code §59.1-92.12(i), VA. Code Ann. § 59.1-92.12(i) (West 2011). Radiance appealed, and the EFF and ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of Radiance.

Building on three prior Circuit Court cases holdings that “artistic or political use of a trademark” and “literary titles” do not violate the Lanham Act “so long as the level of relevance to the underlying work is merely . . . above zero,” the EFF and the ACLU argue that Radiance’s use of the term “NAACP” in an article title was not infringing on a confusion theory. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), and E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir 2008). The brief reasons that “Radiance’s use of NAACP’s trademark in the title of an article was directly relevant to the article’s political goal and did not explicitly mislead as to the source or content of the article.”  The brief emphasizes that Rogers, Mattel, and E.S.S. Entertainment showed “that the First Amendment broadly protects cultural reference, commentary, criticism and parody, including when such speech uses anther’s trademark.”"
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/internet/trademark-infringement-or-first-amendment-right-of-freedom-of-speech



"TRADEMARK RIGHTS GIVE WAY TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION"
http://allrightsreservedblog.com/2013/08/07/trademark-rights-give-way-to-freedom-of-expression/



Roll (Over) Tide! Free Speech Trumps Trademark Rights
http://www.srlawebsite.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Session-44-Batista.pdf



"[A] recent federal court decision from Virginia would allow trademarks to trump speech. 

In that case, Radiance Foundation v. NAACP, the fight was over a blog post that criticized the NAACP. The Radiance Foundation is a conservative non-profit that advocates for what it perceives to be appropriate family values. In a blog post titled “NAACP: National Association for the Abortion of Colored People,” Radiance claimed that the NAACP embraces “all things liberal, most things socialistic, and nothing pro-life.”

The NAACP responded with a letter to Radiance threatening a lawsuit if it did not cease “using” the NAACP’s trademark. Radiance called on the courts for protection, asking for a declaration the blog post was protected speech. After a bench trial, Judge Raymond Jackson ruled against Radiance, finding that Radiance’s post infringed the NAACP’s trademark …."

Source and More
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/13/is-it-trademark-infringement-to-publish-an-online-article-with-the-title-naacp-national-association-for-the-abortion-of-colored-people/


The First Amendment TRUMPS Trademark 

Especially in Gripe Sites but NOT when it comes to First Amendment Attorney Marc Randazza Suing Blogger Crystal Cox to retaliate, to suppress speech, to intimidate, to defame and paint her in false light to the world. Then Trademark is KING and Marc Randazza uses his power over the court process to take massive online content for 2 years and counting.   Marc Randazza stole blogs, domain names, search engine ranking and all with lies to the courts and cries of Trademark VIOLATION which were flat out FALSE.

More on Marc Randazza's Hypocrisy

http://unethicalscumattorney.blogspot.com/


Summary Judgment Denial Marc Randazza v. Crystal Cox case
http://ia701205.us.archive.org/2/items/gov.uscourts.nvd.91330/gov.uscourts.nvd.91330.200.0.pdf

Randaza v. Cox Docket, Including Counter Claim
Marc Randazza claimed my Gripe sites violated his ALLEGED "Trademark".
http://ia601205.us.archive.org/2/items/gov.uscourts.nvd.91330/gov.uscourts.nvd.91330.docket.html


if you are Reading this and are an Attorney that wants to represent me in Randazza v. Cox, Please eMail me at SavvyBroker@Yahoo.com; I have a GREAT Counter Claim and you could make some money.

Thursday, May 29, 2014

Randazza v. Blogger Crystal Cox Case; Authentification of Blogs "Authentication of Blogs, YouTube Videos, and Transcripts of YouTube Videos - Circumstantial Authentication of Email Evidence — Periodicals: Authentication vs. Hearsay"

This is a VERY Important Ruling in the Randazza v. Cox case regarding Authentication of Blogs, YouTube Videos, Transcripts of Videos, and Authentication of Email Evidence.

Crystal Cox Video on this Judicial Order



"Authentication of Blogs, YouTube Videos, and Transcripts of YouTube Videos — Circumstantial Authentication of Email Evidence — Periodicals: Authentication vs. Hearsay

Randazza v. Cox, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49762 (D. Nev. April 10, 2014):
This cybersquatting case arises out of the alleged targeting of Plaintiffs Marc Randazza, his wife Jennifer, and their young daughter Natalia, by Defendant Crystal Cox, a self-proclaimed "investigative blogger." The Randazzas allege that Cox and Defendant Eliot Bernstein have engaged in an online harassment campaign to extort them by registering dozens of internet domain names that incorporate the Randazzas' names and then demanding they agree to purchase Cox's "reputation management" services to remove this allegedly defamatory material from the internet and rehabilitate their cyber reputations. Cox maintains that this lawsuit was instituted to harass her and stifle her First Amendment freedoms  [*2] of speech and expression.
The Randazza Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their claims against Cox. But as one of those claims is legally untenable, and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the remainder, their motion is denied. Cox has pending her own motion for summary judgment on her original "Counter-Complaint," which has since been stricken and supplanted (in part) by a new amended counterclaim. ***
In November 2012, the Randazzas sued Cox and Bernstein alleging violations of individual cyberpiracy protections for various registered websites under 15 U.S.C. § 8131,  [*3] cybersquatting for various registered websites under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), their right of publicity under NRS 597.810, their common law right of publicity, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. The claims were based on allegations that Cox and Bernstein registered several domain names containing Plaintiffs' names, that Cox's blog posts contained objectionable characterizations of the Plaintiffs, and that these acts were designed to extort and harass the Randazzas and capitalize on and damage the goodwill Marc Randazza claims he built up in his own name as a prominent First Amendment attorney.
Bernstein has not appeared or answered the allegations, but Cox has. She contends that she registered the domain names to control public relations information when she thought Marc Randazza would represent her in another lawsuit. Cox also strongly objects to Plaintiffs' characterization of her motivation and actions as "extortion."
The tortured history of this case is rife with procedural maneuvering by both sides. All parties have disrupted the Court's timely management of its docket, wasted judicial resources, and threatened the orderly administration of justice by sandbagging the docket  [*4] with multiple impertinent, legally unsupported, and frivolous filings. The instant motions were not spared from these tactics. Despite Mr. Randazza's self-proclaimed prominence as a First Amendment attorney and being represented by independent counsel, Plaintiffs have failed to authenticate more than half of their proffered exhibits in support of their motion; and half of the authenticated ones are immaterial to this motion. Equally confounding is that pro seCox has submitted a 255-page nonsensical summary judgment motion and a 183-page opposition to Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, neither of which includes any relevant legal authority or complies with this Court's rules of procedure and evidence. In short, all parties have fallen far short of sustaining their initial summary judgment burdens and both motions are denied.
A. Authentication of Evidence
The first step in analyzing these motions is to determine what evidence the Court may consider in evaluating whether the parties met their respective burdens. In Orr v. Bank of America, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals "made it clear that 'unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment.'"6 To authenticate  [*5] a document, the proponent must offer "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.'"7 As the summary judgment procedure is the pretrial functional equivalent of a directed-verdict motion, it requires consideration of the same caliber of evidence that would be admitted at trial;8 thus, it is insufficient for a litigant to merely attach a document to a summary judgment motion or opposition without affirmatively demonstrating its authenticity.
6   Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2011) (citingOrr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 733 (9th Cir. 2002).
7   Las Vegas Sands, 632 F.3d at 532-33 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)).
8   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (citing Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983)).
***
1. Periodicals
Plaintiffs offer at Exhibit B an article from Forbes Magazine. Printed material "purporting to be a newspaper or periodical" is self-authenticating.11 Thus, this article is self-authenticating. Its contents, however, are hearsay not subject to any exception. Accordingly, the periodical is not admissible for summary judgment purposes.
11   Fed. R. Evid. 902(6).
2. Websites
Few courts have considered how a website print-out or blog posting may be authenticated. Those that have considered the issue have found "website print-outs [were] sufficiently authenticated where the proponent declared that they were true and correct copies of pages on the  [*8] internet and the print-outs included their webpage URL address and the dates printed."12
12   Haines v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01763-SKO, 2012 WL 1143648 *7 (E.D. Cal. April 4, 2012).
The websites contained in Exhibits E, K, Q, R, S, and T have been properly authenticated under this standard because Plaintiff Marc Randazza has attested that they are true and correct copies and the print-outs include the webpage URL address and the dates the websites were printed. However, Plaintiffs have not authenticated any of the purported website contents in Exhibits D, G, M, O, and P. Although Mr. Randazza has attested that these exhibits are true and correct copies and the print-outs include the webpage URL address, absent are the dates the webpages were printed. Without the print dates, these website printouts have not been properly authenticated, and the Court will not consider them.
3. Letters, Emails, and Text Messages
A document may be authenticated by personal knowledge "by a witness who wrote it, signed it, used it, or saw others do so."14 Although circumstantial evidence--like an email's context, email address, or previous  [*9] correspondence between the parties--may help to authenticate an email,15 the most direct method of authentication is a statement from its author or an individual who saw the author compose and send the email.16
14   Orr, 285 F.3d at 774 n.8 (citing references omitted).
15   United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2000).
16   United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988, 999 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs have authenticated the letter sent from Mr. Randazza to Defendant Bernstein presented in Exhibit A by Randazza's affidavit stating that he wrote and signed the letter. Similarly, Mr. Randazza's curriculum vitae and the "About" page of his blog attached as Exhibits I and J have been properly authenticated because Mr. Randazza is a person with personal knowledge and he wrote his curriculum vitae and the "About" page of his own blog. Plaintiffs have also authenticated via circumstantial evidence the emails between Cox and Mr. Randazza contained in Exhibit H because the email contains sufficient indicia of authenticity by context, the email addresses, and previous correspondence between the parties.
But Plaintiffs have not authenticated the purported emails between Cox and Dylan Energy CEO  [*10] Martin Cain contained in Exhibit C. Although Plaintiffs attempt to authenticate Exhibit C via circumstantial evidence, there is a gap in the email chain. Mjr@randazza.com purportedly received the forwarded email from matt.baer@dylanenergy.com; savvybroker@ yahoo.com (the email associated with Cox) sent the email to dylanchpmc@verizon.net. Therefore, it is unclear how the person in control of the email address matt.baer@dylanenergy.com came to be in possession of an email originally addressed to dylanchpmc@verizon.net. Without some explanation of the gap in this email chain by someone with personal knowledge, there is insufficient circumstantial indicia of authenticity for the Court to consider this document.
Plaintiffs have not authenticated the text message screen shot in Exhibit A either. The screen shot purporting to be a text-message exchange between Messrs. Randazza and Bernstein has not been authenticated because it does not have circumstantial indicia of authenticity. It is unclear which phone numbers sent or received the messages or to whom those phone numbers belonged when the screen shot was taken, or who took the screen shot. Without this type of supporting evidence, the  [*11] Court cannot consider the text message in Exhibit A.
***
5. YouTube Video
Exhibit N is a transcript of a YouTube video. The single court having addressed how to authenticate a Youtube.com video, albeit in a criminal context, found that videos from the online video network are self-authenticating as a certified domestic record of a regular conducted activity if their proponent satisfies the requirements of the business-records hearsay exception.20 To meet this exception, the evidence must be accompanied by "a certification of their custodian or other qualified person that satisfies three requirements: (A) that the records were 'made at or near the time by--or from information transmitted by--someone with knowledge'; (B) that they were 'kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business'; and (C) that 'making the record was a regular practice of that activity.'"21
20   United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132-33 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding the YouTube  [*13] video in question was self-authenticating under Federal Rule of Evidence 902 business records).
21   Id. at 133.
The transcript of the YouTube video contained in Exhibit N has not been properly authenticated. Although Mr. Randazza has attested that it is a true and correct copy of a transcript of a video posted on YouTube.com, he has not established that he is a person with personal knowledge who prepared the transcript, nor has he established when it was prepared and that it is complete and accurate. To the extent that the YouTube.com video itself is offered as evidence, it similarly has not been authenticated because Plaintiffs have not proffered the certificate of YouTube's custodian or other qualified person verifying that the page had been maintained as a business record in the course of regularly conducted business activities. Without this certification, the video has not been properly authenticated and cannot be considered.
With these evidentiary limitations, the Court now turns to the merits of Plaintiffs' summary judgment arguments."

Source
 http://www.jha.com/us/blog/?blogID=2777

Tuesday, May 13, 2014

Godaddy.com Cedar Rapids, Iowa

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13 May14:23:06

Wednesday, April 9, 2014

Ya Ari Bass is EVIL and Ya is Connected to Randazza Legal Group

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BUDDIES

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9 Apr16:31:24

Monday, January 27, 2014

A Bit on the importance of an IMPARTIAL Judge


"According to, Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, Second Edition,
Charles Gardner Geyh, Associate Dean of Research, John F. Kimberling Professor of
Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, a Federal Judicial Center Publication;

"For centuries, impartiality has been a defining feature of the Anglo-American judge’s role in the
administration of justice

The reason is clear: in a constitutional order grounded in the rule of law, it is imperative that judges make decisions according to law, unclouded by personal bias or conflicts of interest.

Accordingly, upon ascending the bench, every federal judge takes an oath to
“faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties” of judicial office; and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been
construed to guarantee litigants the right to a “neutral and detached,” or impartial, judge.

Moreover, in a democratic republic in which the legitimacy of government depends on the
consent and approval of the governed, public confidence in the administration of justice is
indispensable. 

It is not enough that judges be impartial; the public must perceive them to be so.

The Code of Conduct for United States Judges therefore admonishes judges to “act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”
and to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities"

"When the impartiality of a judge is in doubt, the appropriate remedy is to disqualify that judge
from hearing further proceedings in the matter.

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., a case concerning disqualification of a state supreme court justice, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that litigants have a due process right to an impartial judge, and that under circumstances in which judicial bias was probable, due process required disqualification. The Court noted, however, that disqualification rules may be and often are more rigorous than the Due Process Clause requires.

So it is with disqualification requirements for federal judges, which require disqualification when a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned."

Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455

A. Overview

1. The text of § 455 The primary source of disqualification law in the federal judicial system is 28
U.S.C. § 455. It provides, in its entirety, as follows:

§ 455. Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or
such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning
the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in
controversy;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his
household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee
of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in
the proceeding.

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a
reasonable effort to inform himself about the
personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in
his household. 10 Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law

(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases
shall have the meaning indicated:

(1) “proceeding” includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or other
stages of litigation;

(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;

(3) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;
(4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a
relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that
holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the
judge participates in the management of the fund;

(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a
“financial interest” in securities held by the organization;

(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a
mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is a “financial interest” in the
organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
interest;

(iv) Ownership of government securities is a “financial interest”
in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
securities.
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to
the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in
subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under
subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full
disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.
(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge, magistrate
judge, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after
substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the appearance or
discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she individually or as a
fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her household, has a financial
interest in a party (other than an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome),
disqualification is not required if the justice, judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, spouse or
minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the
grounds for the disqualification.
Sections (a) and (b) occupy the core of § 455 and should be read
together. The two sections divide the universe of disqualification into
two halves: the general, catch-all category of § 455(a), which requires
disqualification from any proceeding in which a judge’s “impartiality
might reasonably be questioned”; and a list of more specific grounds
for disqualification in § (b).
The remainder of § 455 is directed at implementing §§ (a) and (b):
• Section (c) admonishes judges to keep abreast of their financial
interests to ensure that they know when to disqualify themselves under § 455(b)(4).
• Section (d) defines terms employed in §§ (a) and (b).
• Section (e) provides parties with a limited opportunity to waive
disqualification otherwise required by the catch-all § (a)—
typically where the judge is poised to disqualify himself or herself sua sponte—but does not
permit the parties to waive disqualification required by the more specific provisions of § (b).
• Section (f) provides a limited opportunity for judges to avoid
the need to disqualify themselves for financial interest under
§ (b)(4) through divestiture.
2. Interpretive ground rules
a. Interpreting § 455(a) in relation to § 455(b)

As embodied in § 455, §§ (a) and (b) are conceptually separate.
Section (a) compels disqualification for the appearance of partiality, while
§ (b) “also” compels disqualification for bias, financial interest, and
other specific grounds. In contrast, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct—after which § 455 was
originally modeled—and the current Code of Conduct for United States Judges unify the two
halves conceptually by characterizing the specific grounds for disqualification as a nonexclusive
subset of circumstances in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
 For the most part, this may be a distinction without a difference—disqualification is required if
the specific or general provisions are triggered, regardless of whether the specific provisions are
characterized as a subset of or separate from the general.

On the other hand, by onceptualizing them separately, § 455 can require disqualification under specific circumstances enumerated in § (b) that might not reasonably be characterized as calling a judge’s impartiality into question under § (a). For example, § (b)(4) requires judges to disqualify themselves for financial interest
“however small,” which necessarily includes an interest so small that it could not reasonably call the judge’s impartiality into question.

Any circumstance in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned under §
(a) requires disqualification, even if the circumstance is not enumerated in § 455(b).
 At the same time, when § 455(b) identifies a particular situation requiring disqualification, it will
tend to control any § 455

(a) analysis with respect to that specific situation. For example, §455(b)(5) requires disqualification when one of the parties is within the third degree of relationship to the judge. Consequently, a fourth-degree relationship to a party does not by itself create an appearance of partiality requiring disqualification under § 455(a)— although disqualification under § 455(a) might still be appropriate if, for example, the judge’s
personal relationship with the fourth-degree relative was so close as to call the judge’s impartiality into question. As the Supreme Court explained, “[s]ection 455(b)(5), which addresses
the matter of relationship specifically, ends the disability at the thirddegree of relationship, and
that should obviously govern for purposes of § 455(a) as well.”
The 1974 amendments to § 455, however, shifted the balance by requiring disqualification whenever a judge’s impartiality “might” reasonably be questioned, and the legislative history made clear that in revising the statute, Congress sought to end the “duty to sit".

“When Congress amended § 455(a), it made clear that judges should apply an objective
standard in determining whether to disqualify. A judge contemplating disqualification under §
455(a), then, should not ask whether he or she believes he or she is capable of impartially
presiding over the case.

 Rather, the question is whether a judge’s impartiality might be questioned from the perspective of a reasonable person,and every circuit has adopted some version of the “reasonable person” standard to answer this question.

 In the context of denying a motion for his disqualification from Cheney v. United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, Justice Scalia noted that this reasonable person is aware “of
all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” The Second Circuit has characterized the
reasonable person as an “objective, disinterested observer” who is privy to full knowledge of the
surrounding circumstances.”
...
“The question has sometimes arisen as to whether the standard for disqualification differs in a
bench trial where the judge’s role is even more pivotal than in a jury trial. In Alexander v.
Primerica Holdings, Inc., the court of appeals said: “We cannot overlook the fact that this is a
non-jury case, and that [the judge] will be deciding each and every substantive issue at trial . . . .
When the judge is the actual trier of fact, the need to presserve the appearance of impartiality is
especially pronounced”

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455, and upon examination of the record, I, Personally believe that Judge Martin Colin is NOT impartial and is violating the constitutional and lawful rights of the victims in this case.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/455